

# GO WORLD

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1977

NO.3



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*Go World* is published by The Ishi Press. Address subscriptions to The Ishi Press, CPO Box 2126, Tokyo.

Editor: John Power

Yearly subscription rate: \$16.50 (6 issues by seaimail).

Price per single issue: \$2.75.

Airmail rate: \$22.50 per year; \$3.75 per issue.

(Discounts are available for bulk orders by seaimail)

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## Go World News

### Kato Defends Gosei Title

To the surprise of most Go fans, Kato Masao had little trouble disposing of the challenge of Takemiya Honinbo for his Gosei title. Kato rebuffed Takemiya with three straight victories and never even let him get within striking distance. Kato has been in superb form this year, but even so no one anticipated that he would win so convincingly. Kato defeated Sakata by the same margin in the Judan title match earlier this year. Perhaps he is compensating for all his own unsuccessful title challenges in the past—having finally secured some titles, he is making sure that he hangs on to them.

The results:

*Game 1* (May 4). Kato (B) by resignation.

*Game 2* (May 16). Kato (W) by 1½ points.

*Game 3* (May 30). Kato (B) by 5½ points.

### Kato Leads Takemiya Honinbo

Takemiya Masaki is in imminent danger of losing his Honinbo title to the challenger Kato

Masao. Somehow Kato seems to have taken the measure of Takemiya and has now got him on the run. He is leading their title match with three wins to one loss, which means that he has three chances to usurp the Honinbo title. Already no one seems to doubt that Kato will be the next Honinbo—rather the question is whether Takemiya can fight back at all. Apart from the first game (presented in this issue), in which Takemiya played an uncharacteristically poor fuseki, there has been no marked disparity in technical skill, but it seems that Takemiya has been unable to match Kato's tenacity and sheer will to win.

The results to date:

*Game 1* (May 9, 10). Kato (B) by resignation.

*Game 2* (May 23, 24). Takemiya (B) by resig.

*Game 3* (June 8, 9). Kato (B) by 7½ points.

*Game 4* (June 15, 16). Kato (W) by resig.

### 1977 Spring Promotions

The following players have earned promotions in the spring *oteai* (rating tournament):



*Takemiya's challenge rebuffed—Kato retains Gosei Title.*





*The Honinbo title about to change hands? Takemiya looks unhappy on losing the 4th game.*

To 9-dan: Hoshino Toshi  
To 8-dan: Kobayashi Koichi Tengen

To 7-dan: Kageyama Toshiro  
To 6-dan: Nagahara Yoshiaki

**1977 Meijin League (as of June 23)**

	I	R	S	H	Ku.	Kaj.	Kat.	S	C	Score
1. Ishida	—	×	○	○		○	×		○	4-2
2. Rin	○	—	×	○	○			○	○	5-1
3. Sakata	×	○	—	○		○	×	○	○	5-2
4. Hashimoto	×	×	×	—	○	○		○		3-3
5. Kubouchi		×		×	—	×	○	×	×	1-5
5. Kajiwara	×		×	×	○	—	×		○	2-4
7. Kato	○		○		×	○	—	○		4-1
7. Shiraishi		×	×	×	○		×	—		1-4
7. Cho	×	×	×		○	×			—	1-4

*The players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.*



## 15th Judan Title: Game Three

**White:** Kato Masao Judan

**Black:** Sakata Eio 9-dan

Komi:  $5\frac{1}{2}$

Date: 13th April, 1977

Time: 6 hours each




Figure 1 (1-30)

### Figure 1 (1-30). *A peculiar fuseki*


By the third game of this title series, fans of Sakata must have been feeling a little apprehensive. How on earth was he to beat Kato? If he could lose the first game, in which he had played so brilliantly, anything could happen. He had also let slip a possible chance to win late in the second game, so here he was with his back to the wall when it could just as easily have been 2-0 in his favour.

Sakata's playing in this game, however, showed no signs that he felt the strain. In fact, he matched Kato blow for blow. Fujisawa Shuko commented in admiration, "It's unusual to see such a bloodthirsty game nowadays. Playing like this would be quite beyond me."

White 10-Black 17. A rather unusual *mane-go* (imitation Go) style fuseki pattern. Black's strategy is to divide the bottom half of the board evenly, as he thinks that his position at the top is slightly superior.

Black 19. A sharp move, typical of Sakata. The peaceful response at *a* would continue what so far has been a leisurely fuseki.

Black 23. This move, keeping the atari at 29 in reserve, is a standard tesuji. If Black gives atari at 1 in *Dia. 1* before attaching at 3, White is content to answer at 4, as capturing at 2 dissolves any adverse potential in the corner.



Dia. 1

White 24. A natural counterattack, considering that Black omitted 29. Some very severe fighting started when White pushed through and cut with 26 and 28.

White 30. Capturing at *b* would be more usual, but White anticipates that 30 will be of more use to him in the centre fighting that is obviously coming up.

### Figure 2 (31-48). *The first skirmish*

Black 33. Black has no choice but to extend here. He would like to be able to block at 1 in *Dia. 2*, but White would counter by cutting at 2 and 4,








Figure 2 (31-48)




Dia. 2

then making a hane at 6. He can then catch one lot of black stones by playing out at 8. (Note that White can play White *a*, Black *b*, White *c*). Black can choose which stones he gives up, but that is nothing to be proud of.

The hane at 34 is a vital point, while 37 induces 38 in order to give Black the momentum to defend at 39. Note that White 42 is the only move here. Attempting to set up a ladder with 1 in *Dia. 3* would be a mistake. Black attacks with 2 and 4, forcing White 5 and 7, then plays 8, thus making miai of 9 and 10.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

The fighting set in train by Black 19 had barely subsided when Kato launched another fierce attack by pushing through and cutting with 46 and 48. The peaceful approach here would have been to play 1 etc. in *Dia. 4*. Black will probably defend at 6, so White can jump out at 7. Kato later recognized that 46 and 48 were overplays resulting from his over-enthusiasm for fighting. In Sakata, however, he had an opponent who is at his best in just this kind of rough-and-tumble fight.





Figure 3 (49-75)

**Figure 3 (49-75).** *Treading a thorny path*

Black 55. This strong move, which makes miai of 56 and 57, demonstrates that cutting here was an overplay by White.




*Dia. 5*


White 56. White has no choice. If he defends his centre stones with 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black blocks at 2, forcing White to make the painful connection at 3. Black then connects under in sente with 4 to 8, putting White on the run with an eyeless group. This kind of result would wrap up the game for Black.

Black 57. Capturing White's pivotal stones is quite a success for Black. White tries to take some compensation by pushing through Black's corner enclosure with 58, but Black counters with 59, leaving White with only the narrowest of escape routes for his group.

White 64. The two-step hane at 65 does not work: Black cuts at 64 and White's group is in trouble. In some positions the cut at 3 in *Dia. 6* is a smart tesuji. If Black *a* in answer to 5, White gets a nice result with the diagonal connection at *b*. However, in this game Black will answer by setting up a ko with 6 and 8. Because of his abundance of ko threats in the top left, a ko is just what Black wants.



*Dia. 6*




*Dia. 7*

(Note: if Black changes the order and gives atari at 6 before 4, White answers with the standard tesuji of 4.)

White 66 is a resolute move. Kato of course realizes that Sakata will make the severe peep at 67, but he has made up his mind to let Black cut. He could defend against the cut by playing 66 at 1 in *Dia. 7*, but Black makes the solid defensive move at 2 and White has to flee with 3. Kato commented that he is temperamentally incapable of playing like this.

White 68. The only move, in Kato's opinion, as answering 67 would be too submissive. Whatever happens, he does not want Black to cross under at 68. The price Kato has to pay for having his own way, however, is to be split into two struggling groups.



*Dia. 8*

After the game Sakata commented that he had considered playing Black 67 at 1 in *Dia. 8*. However, he concluded that White 2 would have led to a long drawn-out game. Obviously Sakata believed that he had a good



chance of decisively settling the game in his favour in the fight here.

White ensures himself of one eye with 70 and 72, then pushes up at 74. This sequence is forced. Cutting also means being cut, so some defects are also beginning to appear in Black's position. Nonetheless, White is still in greater trouble.





Figure 4 (76-100)  
ko: 97


#### Figure 4 (76-100). Desperate measures

White 76, 78. An exquisite combination which proves to be of considerable assistance to White in the fighting here.

If instead of 76, White simply connects under at 1 in *Dia. 9*, then Black seals him in with 2. White has no choice but to resort to an unfavourable ko with 3 etc., but Black has more ko



Dia. 9




Dia. 10

threats, so White's prospects are bleak.

Black 79. If at 1 in *Dia. 10*, White connects under at 2. If Black now blocks at 3, White plays 4 to 8. Since White has an eye and one more liberty than Black, he can at least get seki in the corner. Black therefore rejected this sequence, as he wanted to keep chasing the white group.

Having created some complications in the corner, White pushes out at 82. The moves to 85 are forced.

White 86. The purpose of this move is to increase the liberties of the white group. White would like to play down at 1 in *Dia. 11*, but after the sequence to 8, Black wins the fight by one move. White gets life at the top, but this result greatly weakens his group towards the bottom right (i.e. 8, 12 and 16 in Figure 1).



Dia. 11 ⑧ throws in

Black 87. Connecting at 88 is safer, but then White pushes down at 87 and *a*, followed by connecting at *b*, and thus succeeds in looking after both his groups.

White 88. This move is possible

now that White has increased the number of liberties of his group on the right. However, White can hardly expect to win the ko. Connecting at 95 entails losing some points but it gives Black an unlimited number of ko threats.

White 98. Moving out is natural. White's prospects of winning the ko are so slight that it would be disastrous to let Black seal him in with 98.





Figure 5 (101-145)

ko: 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 25, 28,  
31, 34, 37, 40, 43  
45 connects the ko


**Figure 5 (101-145).** *A momentary blind-spot*

White 8. Poking his head out here relieves White of much of the burden of the ko fight. He realizes that he cannot win it, but his strategy is to try and take profit with his ko threats. Actually Black is still giving away points with his ko threats at 11 etc., so the ko is gradually decreasing in importance for White.

White 14. This indicates that Kato is prepared to abandon the corner altogether.



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

White 34. White should have given atari at 38 before capturing the ko. In the heat of battle both players overlooked it at the time, but with 37 Black could have taken profit in sente with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 12*. If White answers at 2 in *Dia. 13*, then Black plays 3 and 5 and White collapses. This momentary blank in the concentration of both players is similar to the one in the Kato—Otake game in the final round of the Honinbo league.

Black finally ended the ko fight with 45, but White had gained some compensation on the left side and also had sente, so at this stage the game seemed quite close.

**Figure 6 (146-200).** *The losing moves*

Black 57 and 59. The losing moves. Sakata was hallucinating that Black *a* was sente. The correct sequence here is shown in *Dia. 14* and after the game the players agreed that this would have left Black still in the lead. The only result of the game sequence was to leave a gap in Black's wall which he had to cover up later. Sakata had already used up his time and was in byo-yomi







Figure 6 (146—200)

of a minute a move, which helps to explain this costly mistake.



Dia. 14

Black 73. This aims at the throw-in at *b*, so White has to reinforce at 74. However, the comparison with *Dia. 14* makes it apparent that Black 57 is a wasted stone. In a close game one can hardly afford to lose a move like this. Moreover, letting White connect at 58 is of course a territorial loss as well.

By now the game had definitely swung in Kato's favour and he was confident of victory.

**Figure 7 (201-271).** *Kato's first defence*  
White 2. If White carelessly answers





Figure 7 (201—271)



Dia. 15

at 1 in *Dia. 15*, Black creates complications with the sequence to 9 shown here. White 2 in the Figure is the safe answer.

Kato must have been pleasantly surprised at defending his title with three straight wins, especially considering the trouble he got into in the first and third games. Sakata's playing showed plenty of his customary bite and brilliance, but perhaps the years are beginning to tell on him. In the end, his stamina was no match for Kato's tenacity and invincible self-confidence.

*White wins by 6½ points.*

*(Time used. White: 4 hours 38 mins.*

*Black: 5 hours 59 mins.)*

# 1977 Honinbo League

## 32nd Honinbo League, Round 7

April 7th: the final round of this year's Honinbo league and a crucial day for four players. The main event of course was the Otake—Kato encounter, as it was the only game with a direct bearing on the challengership. However, Rin Kaiho and Sakata probably approached their own games in no less serious a frame of mind. These two, both former Honinbos, are usually among the main contenders for the challengership, but on this day they were both faced with a fight just to retain their places in the league. The other former Honinbo, Ishida Yoshio, was comparatively safe, as he already had four wins, but a three-way tie with Sakata and Rin, which would have made a playoff to eliminate one of the three necessary, was theoretically possible. As it happened, Ishida beat Takagi, Rin beat Kubouchi and Sakata lost to Magari by half a point, so complications were avoided. We will look at the Otake-Kato game.

**White:** Otake Hideo Meijin

**Black:** Kato Masao Judan

komi: 5½; date: April 7, 1977

Time: 6 hours each

### Figure 1 (1–50)

The scorching pace that Otake set from the outset of the league aroused speculation that he might become the first player in the history of the league to achieve a perfect 7–0 score (it has been done once in the Meijin league, by Ishida with 8–0 in 1973). However,





Figure 1 (1–50)

Otake's toughest opponent was blocking his path in the final round.

Black 31. A well-timed move. If Black does nothing, White will reinforce himself with the diagonal contact play at *a*.

The moves from 32 to 40 are forced. Playing White 34 at 1 in *Dia. 1* is not a good idea, as White is left with a cutting point at 1 after the sequence to 6.



*Dia. 1*

Black 41 seems to be a bad move, as it is unnecessary if Black is going to cross under with 43 and 45. Black 41 merely helps White to strengthen himself in the corner with 42.

White 46. White is beginning to



build up a large moyo in the centre. Black counters with 47—his strategy is to strengthen himself on the right and then to drive White's group there out towards the centre. He hopes that this will facilitate his moving into White's moyo. Consequently, White plays 48 as a makeshift measure to look after this group before expanding his moyo with the nice move at 50.




Figure 2 (51-70)


### Figure 2 (51-70)

Black 57. This was a bad move, in Takemiya's opinion. He advocated playing 57 at 62, as this is the key point of White's moyo. If White responds with 2 and 4 in *Dia. 2*, each side erases the other's potential territory. Takemiya felt that permitting White to occupy the key central points of 58 and 62 gave him the lead.

Note that White plays 60 to prevent Black from peeping at *a*. Permitting Black 61 does not matter, as Black is open at the bottom left.

### Figure 3 (71-100)

The game had now reached its most



*Dia. 2*

crucial stage. Kato thought for 45 minutes before burrowing in at 71, then took another 36 minutes over the invasion at 73. The order of these moves is important. If Black makes the 73-74 exchange before playing 71, then White may attempt to capture this stone by answering at *a*.

When Black switches back to 77, White naturally attacks with 78 to 82. The game is over if Kato loses these stones, but he has prepared a very skilful counter.

Black pushes through at 83 and 85, then makes the clever cut at 87. If





Figure 3 (71-100)




*Dia. 3*


White answers at 1 in *Dia. 3*, Black plays 2 and 4, followed by the sente move at 6. He then gets a ko with 8 and 10. The addition of Black's extension at 8 makes this a worse ko for White than the one in the Figure. This is the reason why White answers at 88. However, Black is not to be denied—he persists with 89 and 91 and succeeds in setting up a ko. If White plays 90 at 1 in *Dia. 4*, he wins the fight in the corner with the tesuji of 5 and 7. However, closing off the bottom left in sente would give Black a definite lead.

White 92. If at 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black plays 2 to 6. White must defend against Black *b*, so Black gets a terrible ko with *a*. Even if White 1 at *c*, Black still gets a ko with 2 and 4, followed by *a*.


Although White cannot avoid a ko, Black is suffering from a shortage of ko threats. For this reason, Takemiya



*Dia. 4*



*Dia. 5*




*Dia. 6*

considered that initiating the ko with 93 etc. was an overplay. He would have preferred to play 93 at 1 in *Dia. 6*. White *a* does not dissolve the ko, so White has to answer at *b*. Black therefore achieves a result similar to *Dia. 4* and can face the endgame with confidence. Once Black plays 95, he loses the option of following *Dia. 6*, as White can dissolve the ko with one move (i.e. 104 in Figure 4).

### Figure 4 (101–133)


The best threat Black can come up with is 7, so White promptly dissolves the ko, securing a lead in the game at the same time. Black's only hope is



*Figure 4 (101–133)*  
⑥ takes ko



to gain profit at the bottom through attacking White's group. White would probably have ignored any other ko threat. For example, if Black makes a hane at 30 instead of 7, White will end the ko, then if Black *a*, secure compensation for the damage suffered at the top by invading at 25.



*Dia. 7*


White 14. One might expect the block at 1 in *Dia. 7*, but then Black destroys White's eye-shape with 2, so White has to flee at 3. The atari at *a* is of some assistance to White, but 4 gives Black more points here than in the game sequence. Presumably Otake did not like this result.

When the players adjourned for the evening meal after Black 15, Otake seemed to be on the point of creating a record by overcoming all his opponents in the Honinbo league.


### Figure 5 (134–163)

White 34 is Otake's first slip. Making the hane at 1 in *Dia. 8* is better. Takemiya hypothesized the continuation to 7, which maintains White's lead.

White 40. Otake perhaps played here out of fighting spirit, but answering at 41 instead would still have kept him slightly ahead. Black's extension at 1 is an enormous move. It is sente, of course, as Black threatens to jump




*Figure 5 (134–163)*




*Dia. 8*

in at *a*. Black seems to have taken over the lead at this point.

Black 43. Both players are suffering from an oversight. Black can cut at 1 in *Dia. 9*. If Black 5, White connects at 6 and saves his group, as the cuts at *a* and *b* are miai. However, Black




*Dia. 9*



*Dia. 10*

can play 5 as in *Dia. 10*, followed by capturing at 7. Otake wakes up first and defends at 46, but this means that he has to yield the initiative in the endgame to Kato.

Black 61, 63. These moves indicate that Kato is sure of victory and wants to wind up the game.



*Figure 6 (164-215)*  
78 at 65; 112 at 71

### Figure 6 (164-215)

White 64. Necessary to prevent Black from capturing a stone with 65. Black still makes the throw-in at 65 in order to finish off this area in sente. This, together with the diagonal move at 81 and the last significant endgame point at 97, guarantee victory for Black.

The game ended at 9.45 p.m. and

Kato won by  $1\frac{1}{2}$  points. He had succeeded in catching up with Otake in the last lap.

(*Time taken.* White: 4 hours, 30 mins.


Black: 5 hours, 41 mins.)

### Honinbo League Playoff

**White:** Otake Hideo

**Black:** Kato Masao

date: 28th April




*Figure 1 (1-40)*

### Figure 1 (1-40)

In the league the colours the players take are decided by lot at the beginning of the league. The playoff is separate, but by coincidence Kato got Black again. No one was surprised to see him begin again with his favourite "revised" Chinese-style fuseki. In fact, the fuseki of this game followed the league game up to the 14th move.

White 18. A vogue move recently, this seems to be purely a 20th century innovation. Fond though they are of nomenclature, the Japanese have not yet come up with a special term to describe this move.

White 24. If at 1 in *Dia. 1*, Black




*Dia. 1*

replies forcefully with 2 to 6, which is bad for White.

Black 31. This met with general disapproval from the players following the game, as White 32 is a perfect reducing move. Otake expected Black to play 31 at *a*, which is an excellent point on the right. 31 at *b* would be a Takemiya-style move. In either case, building up his moyo on the right should have been Black's first priority.

White 36. Switching elsewhere after this single peep is an interesting approach. If Black plays at 1 in *Dia. 2*, White captures a stone in sente with 2 to 8, sacrificing his own stone at 32. This is not an enticing prospect for Black.




*Dia. 2*

White 38, 40. Players following the game were lost in amazement at the dizzying speed with which Otake flitted around the Go board.

## Figure 2 (41-81)

White 42. Otake seems to have decided on a strategy of emphasizing territory.

Black 43. After this move, the se-



*Figure 2 (41-81)*


quence to 57 is forced. If 43 at 50, White jumps to 45.

Black 53. If at *a*, then White 54, Black *b*, White *c* and White wins the fight by one move.

Black 63. Kato has decided to drive the white group out towards the centre in the hope of being able to initiate a splitting attack on it and the unsettled white group at the top. If he plays 63 at 64, White continues with *d*, Black *e*, White *f*, and it is doubtful that Black can make a sufficiently effective attack on the white group at the top.


Black 73. Another move which did not meet with much approval. The consensus of opinion was that this peep was on the wrong side, as it should have been at 1 in *Dia. 3*. Ishida Yoshio hypothesized the continuation shown there. Black 9 could also be at 10, but in either case White is prevented from getting definite eye-shape.

White 74. An excellent hane. On seeing this move, Fujisawa Shuko declared that White had a certain win.



*Dia. 3*

The forcing moves 76 and 80 are a great help in stabilizing White's group.




*Figure 3 (82-120)*

*ko* : 90, 93, 96, 99, 102, 105, 108, 111

### Figure 3 (82-120)

White 82. The existence of this move is why peeping at 73 was wrong and why Otake ignored it. After 84 to 88, attaching at *a* and playing the *ko* are miai for White. When the *ko* starts, he has plenty of moves threatening to get life for his group. After 94, 100, 106 and 112, this group is virtually secure.


Incidentally, White 104 is a mistake, according to Ishida, who claims that White 1 in *Dia. 4* is the only move. When Black makes a *ko* threat at 2, White answers at 3, and this makes a big difference when the White *a*—



*Dia. 4*

Black *b* exchange is made later on. The reason will be clarified in Figure 4.

Black 113. The addition of 107 weakens the white group at the bottom, so Black leaves the *ko* for the time being and attacks at 113. Making a purely territorial move such as pushing through at *b* is quite inadequate for Black in this position.



*Figure 4 (121-142)*

*ko* : 29, 32, 39, 42

### Figure 4 (121-142)



Kato attacks fiercely with 21, but after White 24 he runs out of steam, so he switches back to the top with 25.



He has no choice about persevering with the ko fight, as he can hardly afford the time to connect the ko.

Black 33. The purpose of this move is to forestall White *a*, which threatens to make a second eye or to connect under. It is now clear why White 104 in Figure 3 was a bad move, as Black is left with the option of capturing these three stones.

Black 37. Attempting to capture White is unreasonable. If Black 1 to 5 in *Dia. 5*, White 6 makes miai of capturing one stone at 7 or the whole



black group with 8. Black 1 in *Dia. 6* does not work either. The moves to 7 give a seki between these two groups, but White then plays 8. If Black plays 9 to prevent White from getting two eyes, then White turns at 10, capturing the corner group.

### Figure 5 (143–158)

Because of his shortage of ko threats, Kato has little choice but to give way with 43, but when Otake captures at






Figure 5 (143–158)

44, the game seems to be over. However, winning a 'won' game is not so easy. White 48 and 50 are cautious moves, guaranteeing White a second eye, but they are unnecessary. Ishida recommended playing 48 at 1 in *Dia. 7*. If Black plays 2 to deprive White of eyes, the sequence to 10 produces a ko, but White has a good ko threat at *a*. If Black connects at *b*, White gets more ko threats here. This would have been the safest approach for White.




White 52. The losing move. Otake responded here instinctively as it was good shape, then was startled to see Black cut with 53 and 55. He had no choice but to give up his three stones. If he had played at 2 in *Dia. 8*, he would have kept his lead in the game.



*Dia. 8*

If Black 3, White attaches at 4, then reinforces at 6.


Alternatively, the crude but effective sequence of White 53—Black *a*—White *b* was also good enough for White. Otake is always a fast player (at 158 he had used only 3 hours 1 minute in contrast to Kato's 5 hours 29 minutes) and he thought about 52 for less than a minute. This momentary lapse of concentration proved to be very costly, for after 58 he seems to have had no chance of winning.



*Figure 6 (159-200)*

### Figure 6 (159-200)

White 84,86. This was a desperation measure. Black 87 was Kato's first move in byo-yomi (a minute a move) but it was the best answer. Pushing out at *a* achieves nothing for White, as Black just keeps extending towards




*Figure 7 (201-249)*

*ko* : 26 (left of 11), 29, 32

his stones at the top. However, when White attached at 96, Black had to reinforce at 97.

### Figure 7 (201-249)

Otake resigned after Black 249 with the comment that he was quite a bit behind. The difference was not actually so great. *Dia. 9* gives a simplified version of the remaining endgame worked out by Ishida Yoshio (ko fights, for example, are omitted). The result there puts Black  $2\frac{1}{2}$  points ahead. Considering that Otake has in the past



*Dia. 9*

resigned a game which he calculated he would lose by 1 point, one can readily imagine that the gap in this game seemed insurmountable to him.

Once again Kato had fought on tenaciously in an unfavourable position and succeeded in staging an upset. His two successive wins over Otake presented him with his second opportunity to challenge for the Honinbo title. In 1969, Rin Kaiho, in what was his first defence of the title won from

Sakata the previous year, had rebuffed him by a margin of 4 to 2. For Kato that was the first of a series of unsuccessful title challenges, but today he is a different player. He has lost none of his awesome fighting power, but it is now tempered with mature positional judgement and the capacity to absorb temporary setbacks. Takemiya Honinbo will have to look to his laurels.

(Time taken. White: 4 hours 11 mins.

Black: 5 hours 59 mins.)

## 32nd Honinbo Title: 1st Game


**White:** Takemiya Honinbo

**Black:** Kato Masao

komi: 5½

date: 9th, 10th May, 1977

time: 9 hours each



*Kato plays the first move of the 1977 Honinbo title match. Watching (from right) are Sakakibara 9-dan, Hasegawa, Hon. 8-dan, and Takagawa, Hon. Honinbo.*




Figure 1 (1-27)


**Figure 1 (1-27). A poor beginning**

The luck of the draw gave Kato Black again. So far, no opponent has given him any good reason to abandon his favourite "revised" Chinese style fuseki.


Black 15. This move is low because of the presence of 6 to the left. It can also be taken as an invitation to White to invade at 16. The sequence to 22 is a popular joseki in this fuseki. 22 can also be at *a*.

White 24. This is a misguided invasion. Black 25 is a calm response which is actually quite a strong move, though it may seem a little submissive. The reason is that it weakens White's group on the right, as without 25 White can use the contact play at *b* to help settle himself. Omitting the reinforcement at 26 is dangerous, so Black is able to take the last large fuseki point at 27. This puts White at a disadvantage right at the outset of the game.

In the opinion of Takagawa, White should have played 24 at 1 in *Dia. 1*. If Black attacks with 2, White can



*Dia. 1*



*Dia. 2*




Figure 2 (28-54)

fix up his shape with 3 and 5.

This poor beginning is quite unusual for Takemiya. As a rule, fuseki is his strong point.

**Figure 2 (28-54). White falls behind**

White 28. White has no choice but to plunge in boldly in an attempt to retrieve his fortunes.

White 32. The possibility of playing this move at 1 in *Dia. 2* instead was discussed after the game. However, Black replies by capping at 2, then builds a strong outside wall with 4 to 8. White, on the other hand, gets almost no territory, so he finds this



result far from satisfactory. For this reason White plays at 32, but this allows Black the nice attacking move at 33.

Black 35. The key point to prevent White from settling his group.

White 36. This may seem to be an efficient move, but actually it is an over-extension. White should make the solid move at *a*. If Black still answers at 37, White jumps again, to *b*, and his group is reasonably safe. If Black caps at *b* in response to *a*, White invades the side at 37.

Black 41. This guards against moves such as White *c* or *d*. White is now compelled to reinforce at 42—he would have no answer to a black move at 42. This is why White 36 was an over-play. The two slack moves of 24 and 36 make this game an uphill struggle for Takemiya.

**Figure 3 (55–89).** *On the attack*

Black 55 permits White to enclose at 56, but Kato does not mind this, as he feels that White's moyo at the bottom is still incomplete. If he were





Figure 3 (55–89)  
79 : connects

worried about the moyo, he could move into it with 55 at *a* (White would answer at *b*). Black 55 mainly aims at attacking the white group above.

After making the probing moves at 57, 61 and 63, Kato switches back to his main concern: harassing White's large eyeless group. Black 65 and 67 are a severe combination, but White resists strongly with 68 (instead of making a simple extension at 77, for example). However, Kato continues attacking furiously with 71 and 73, separating White's groups in an attempt to win the game with one blow.


White 74. The sealed move at the end of the first day. Takemiya is faced with a very difficult choice. 74 is obvious, but then he has to consider playing 76 at 1 in *Dia. 3*. He can live with 3 to 7, but Black can play 10 to 16 at the bottom in sente, then block off the top with 18. This result is favourable for Black, so Takemiya opts for 76 in the Figure. However, this seems even more unfavourable for White, as Black greatly strengthens himself with 77 etc.

White 82. If White omits this move, playing at 1 in *Dia. 4*, for example,



Dia. 3

Black makes profit in the corner in sente with 2 and 4. White has to secure life with 5 to 9, so Black can then extend at 10, again threatening the life of the large white group. White 82 and 84 are therefore natural, but Black keeps up the pressure with the good move of 85.




*Dia. 4*

White 86 is a useful move which prevents Black from connecting under with *c*. In addition, it threatens an attack on the centre black group, so Black reinforces with 87 and 89. Black 89 defends against White *d*, Black *e*, White *f*. 87 and 89 also serve to attack White's eye-shape.

**Figure 4 (90–120).** *Preparing for the kill*

White 102 is a do or die move. Either Takemiya is confident of getting two eyes for his group or he believes that he will fall behind in territory if he defends it. To add to his



*Figure 4 (90–120)*

problems, Takemiya ran out of time at this point and went into byo-yomi of a minute a move.

Black 113. An important forcing move, the meaning of which will be shown in the next Figure.


White 116. If White omits this move, Black plays 1 etc. in *Dia. 5*, killing White with bent four in the corner. After 117, however, it seems to be impossible to get two eyes.

**Figure 5 (121–165).** *Beyond rescue*

White 34. If White plays out at 35, Black can answer with *a*, White 61, Black *b*, thanks to ▲ (Black 113).


White 50 is a desperate but unsuccessful attempt to set up a fight in the corner. Note that 50 at 51 fails because of Black 2 etc. in *Dia. 6*. Takemiya finally acknowledged defeat after Black 165. This was a most inauspicious start to the title match for him.

(Time used. W: 8.59; B: 6.9)



*Dia. 5*

*Dia. 6*



*Figure 5 (121–165)*

## 2nd Gosei Title

### Game One

**White:** Takemiya Masaki

**Black:** Kato Masao

komi: 5½; time: 5 hours each

date: 4th May, 1977




Figure 1 (1-39)

#### Figure 1 (1-39)

In this title match also, Kato drew Black for the first game, so naturally he started with his favourite fuseki. This year Kato has been virtually invincible with Black.

White 20. White pushes in here to take sente, but this move is questionable, as Black builds nice thickness with 25.

#### Figure 2 (40-79)

Black takes the top left corner with 39 to 45, but White maintains territorial balance with 46.

Black 47 is a slack move—Black is so strong on the right that this reinforcement is not urgent. Instead, Black




Figure 2 (40-79)

ko : 63, 66, 69

should invade immediately at 49. If White 50, Black makes a two-step hane at 57 and should have no difficulty settling himself here.

White 48 is an excellent move. Black must still invade at 49, but if he now answers 50 at 57, White simply connects at 51, as 48 occupies the key point in the centre. Kato therefore cuts at 51 in order to complicate the position.

Black virtually settles his group with the sequence to 71, but the thickness White builds in the centre makes this an unsatisfactory result for Black.

Black 73. The desire to poke one's head out into the centre is natural, but securing clear-cut eye-shape with *a* or *b* is preferable. White can deprive Black of eyes at any time by playing in at *a*, a threat which handicaps Black in the later fighting.

Black has to erase at 77 before White's centre expands too much, but

the leisurely answer at 78 is good enough for White. Conscious that the balance of the overall position has tipped against him, Kato stakes everything on the bold invasion at 79.





Figure 3 (79-101)


### Figure 3 (79-101)

White 80 is a cautious move, played because Takemiya is confident that he is ahead. He could have offered stronger resistance by blocking at 1 in *Dia. 1*. Black dodges to the left and has to be satisfied with crossing under on the side with 6 to 14. White defends with 15, getting a far superior result to that in the Figure.



*Dia. 1*

White 82. Blocking at 1 in *Dia. 2* is bad for White, as Black continues with 2 to 6. Black can secure a base with *a* or *b*. White 82 is therefore




*Dia. 2*

forced, so Black settles his group comfortably, making considerable profit at the same time, with the sequence to 89. The success of this invasion swings the game in Black's favour.

White 90. Black light-heartedly discards the centre stone, as he has made ample profit at the bottom. Trying to pull this stone out would be risky, as White could aim at a simultaneous attack on it and the black group on the left. The possibility of White *a* is the main source of concern.

Black 93. Securing definite eye-shape for this group is a load off Kato's mind. Moreover, 93 is a big endgame move in itself, as Black has the continuation of 97 and 99. If White answers 97 with 2 in *Dia. 3*, Black plays 3 to 7 in sente. He can also aim at a ko by jumping in at *a* later.



*Dia. 3*

Black 101 both defends the top and guards against an invasion at the 3-3 point. Getting in this move ensures Black of victory.

### Figure 4 (102-141)

White does his best to expand the



## Game Two

White: Kato

Black: Takemiya

date: 16th May, 1977




Figure 4 (102-141)




Figure 5 (142-191)

centre with 2 to 10, but it is not enough. Black 27 is a very large move.

### Figure 5 (142-191)

Black's slack move at 47 in Figure 2 permitted White to set up a large moyo, thus making it a tough game for Black. However, he was rescued by White's surprisingly mild response to his invasion at 79. This helped Black to turn the tables on White and get off to a good start in his title defence.

*White resigns after Black 191.*




Figure 1 (1-41)

### Figure 1 (1-41)

White 24 is one of the natural points for invasion in this pattern (another is one line above 29). Black naturally resists with 25, as defending the corner with *a* is a negative approach. Black builds a wall here in order to attack the white stones in the centre. Both sides are satisfied with the result to 32.

White 36. The safety-first move is *b*, but White does not want Black to set up a moyo with *c*.

### Figure 2 (42-82)

Black 53, 55. A nice combination. If White plays 56 at 1 in *Dia. 1*, Black plays 2 to 6 and cannot be captured. If White *a*, Black answers with *b*, White *c*, Black *d*, White *e*, Black *f*. If then White *g*, Black sets up a ko with *h*. Black has threats at *i* and at





Figure 2 (42-82)



Dia. 1

*a* in the Figure.

Black 61 is the key point for attacking this group. White has no choice but to submit at 62. The extent to which Black can harass this large group will play a large part in deciding the result of the game.

Black 71. A slack move, in Kato's opinion. He feels that attacking at *b* (White *c*, Black 74 follow) is more severe. The thickness White builds with 72 and 74 helps his group.

### Figure 3 (83-115)

White 94. Kato comments that White 95-Black 99-White 94 is better. Black 95 and 97 reduce White's liberties here, so he has to worry about the possibility of Black *a*.

White 102. If White omits this move, Black plays 102. He can then aim at attacking at *a*, as he has the sequence





Figure 3 (83-115)

Black *b*, White *c*, Black *d*, which reduces White's liberties.


Black 103, 105. Good moves. Even if White attacks the bottom group with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*, Black rescues himself with 6.



Dia. 2

White 110. This move not only gains nothing but also provokes the severe counterattack of 111. Omitting it altogether and playing 1 etc. in *Dia. 3* is preferable. White can always get an extra eye with White *a*, Black *b*, White *c*.

Black 115. The game is extremely



Dia. 3





Figure 4 (116-158)

close at this point. Already a half point margin seems likely.

#### Figure 4 (116-158)

White 24, 26. A standard combination preventing the ko in *Dia. 4*.

White 44. If White carelessly blocks at 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black sets up a terrible



*Dia. 4*

*Dia. 5*  
9 : ko

ko with 3 etc.

Black 45 forestalls White *a*.





Figure 5 (158-219)

#### Figure 5 (158-219)

Black 65. The losing move, according to Kato, who comments that 1 in *Dia. 6* is a little better. The continuation to 11 can be expected. This will probably lead to a half point decision, though in whose favour one cannot say.



*Dia. 6*

*Dia. 7*

Black 83. Also bad. Black 1 in *Dia. 7* is worth one point more.


After these mistakes, Black seems to have had no chance of winning. It had been a close and exciting game, but Takemiya had wilted just a little under pressure at the finish.

*White wins by 1½ points.*

(Taken from a commentary by Kato in the July *Kido*)



# GOOD AND BAD STYLE

**Problem: Black to play**




9


## Vulgar style




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
If Black plays 1 and 3, White gets six points in the corner.




11



If Black 1, White gets five points in the corner.




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
The combination of 1 and 3 may be sente but it is not very dynamic.




## Correct style




Attaching at 1 is the move.




White must give way at 2, so Black crosses under with 3. He has made a big dent in White's corner.




Black 1 is a clever move which threatens to kill White with *a*.




White must play 2, so Black gets a seki with 3 and 5 (i.e. zero points for White).




If Black makes a throw-in at 1—



White has to add a stone at *a* later, so he loses a point.



Black 1 is a clever move. If White *a*, Black *b* sets up an unfavourable ko for White.




White must play 2, so Black keeps sente. White's corner decreases by three points.


## IS IT A LADDER?

When one side discovers along the way that he has been misreading a fight in a local situation, he can usually take steps to minimize the damage or to patch up his position. Not so with a ladder—each stone one plays in an unfavourable ladder is a hideous and irretrievable loss. Often one has to resign there and then.


Training oneself to read ladders from the very first move is therefore essential. The following problems are offered as practice. Needless to say, you should try to solve them without playing out the moves on a board.




### Problem 1




## Problem 2




### Problem 3



### Problem 4



### Problem 5



### Problem 6

**Answers on page 60**

# MATCH THE JOSEKI TO THE FUSEKI


by

Sekiyama Toshio 9-dan

In this series we analyse one popular joseki in each instalment and examine the kind of fuseki in which it is most appropriate. Emphasizing rote memorization of joseki is a bad approach—joseki must always be considered as an integral part of the overall position. It is our hope to help clarify the relationship between joseki and fuseki.


In each of these three positions, Black has just answered White 1 with the pincer at 2. This pincer is a joseki variation which can be very effective when correctly timed. However, Black 2 only fits one of the three positions—the other two are fakes. That is to say, in two of the positions Black 2 is a bad move.

Which is the genuine position?




## JOSEKI ANALYSIS

Before giving the answer, let's take a proper look at the joseki.




Basic Diagram

*Basic Diagram.* Played at the right time, Black 1 can be a powerful strategic response to White △.



Dia. 1

*Dia. 1.* The exchange of Black 1, guarding the corner, and White's extension to 2 (or *a*) is played constantly. Approaching it from Black's standpoint, one makes the pincer at 1 in the *Basic Diagram* when one does not want White to extend in the direction of 2 here.




Dia. 2


*Dia. 2.* The important point about Black 1 is that in addition to acting as a pincer, it also works effectively in the direction of the arrow. Black is of course prepared to give up the corner profit to White.

*Dia. 3.* If White jumps to 2, then Black answers at 3. This result is ob-

viously disadvantageous for White—not only has he been prevented from extending down the side (at 2 in Dia. 1), but also he has yielded the vital point of the corner to Black.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

*Dia. 4.* Invading at 2 is the natural answer to 1. One can say that in almost all cases this is the only move.

*Dia. 5.* Next Black makes the blunt moves of 3 and 5, his strategy being to build up influence with a large moyo.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

*Dia. 6.* Continuing with White 6 is very bad. Black seals White in with 7. Next, if White *a*, Black *b*.

*Dia. 7.* The standard continuation in



Dia. 7



Dia. 8




this position is White 6 and Black 7, usually followed by White 8 (or *a*). This is the most peaceful variation. White can also omit 8, but then Black can play *b*, forcing White *c*.


*Dia. 8.* In some positions White may prefer to play out with the hane at 6 rather than follow the peaceful approach of *Dia. 7*.

*Dia. 9.* One answer for Black is to cut at 7. If the ladder favours White, he then pulls back at 9. White's  $\triangle$  stone still retains some latent potential. If the ladder favours him, Black will probably play *a*, but then White can aim at playing a ladder-block at the bottom left of the board.

This may make it seem that the hane at 6 in *Dia. 8* is a strong move for White regardless of whether or not the ladder is favourable, but actually Black has an alternative way of answering.




*Dia. 9*




*Dia. 10*

*Dia. 10.* Black can make the severe cut at 7. If 8, Black connects at 9 and gets a reasonable position.



*Dia. 11*




*Dia. 12*


*Dia. 11.* If White gives atari at 10, blocking at 11 is essential for Black.

*Dia. 12.* When White hanes at 12, Black pushes up at 13, whereupon the sequence to 17 can be expected. This fight is favourable for Black.

*Dia. 13.* Capturing at 14 is no good—Black makes the sente move at 15, followed by *a* and *b*.




*Dia. 13*




*Dia. 14*

*Dia. 14.* Answering Black 5 with the large knight jump to 6 is a special move which is possible on occasion.

*Dia. 15.* Black cuts at 7 and White concludes the exchange with 8. Black is not worried about the possibility of White *a*. If the ladder is unfavourable, he can sacrifice his stone with Black *b*, White *c*, Black *d*.



*Dia. 15*




*Dia. 16*


*Dia. 16.* Another possibility is simply playing the knight's move at 4 in response to 3.

*Dia. 17.* Attaching at 5 is bad, as White counters with 6 and 8.


*Dia. 18.* Black has no choice but to



*Dia. 17*




*Dia. 18*




*Dia. 23*

play 5, so White moves out with 6. In some positions this might be a suitable approach for White.

*Dia. 19.* If the ladder favours White, playing in at 4 is another possible answer to 3.




*Dia. 19*




*Dia. 20*

*Dia. 20.* If Black makes the simple connection at 5 in order to save  $\triangle$ , White continues with 6 and 8. If next Black *a*, then White *b*—this is what White is hoping for.

*Dia. 21.* The correct continuation is to give atari at 5 before connecting at 7.



*Dia. 21*




*Dia. 22*

*Dia. 22.* The moves to 11 are then forced. A favourable ladder with 12 is the prerequisite for White.

*Dia. 23.* Black 13 and 15 wind up this variation. In contrast to the variations previously discussed, this result gives White thickness and Black profit.

By now there should be no doubt in the reader's mind as to which was the correct fuseki.

## THE CORRECT FUSEKI




*The genuine fuseki: Position C*

Black 2 is just right in Position C. Black gives up the corner profit to White and in compensation builds up a large moyo (territorial framework) which dominates the whole board.

If the joseki to 8 follows, all the black stones on the board are working together and *feel* connected. Black's stones are cooperating with each other

—this is the important thing. Black should be able to dominate the subsequent flow of the fighting.

The sequence to 8 is not the only possibility of course, but as the ladder favours Black, White 4 in *Dia. 19* is not possible, so White does not have much scope for variation. Whatever happens, Black will build up thickness here.



*Dia. 1: wrong*


*Dia. 1.* In the context of the overall position, Black 2 is a slack response to White 1. When White extends at 3, one has the feeling that White has sliced through the core of Black's position. A long, drawn-out war of attrition is now unavoidable.

To go back a stage further, White should have made the simple extension to *a* instead of playing 1.

## THE FAKE FUSEKI I: POSITION A

The pincer at 2 is a very bad move in this position. This move does not combine well with  $\triangle$  at the bottom.


White will probably make the



*Position A*

straightforward connection at 7, then push through and cut with 9 and 11. If Black *a* in response to White 13, then White *b* forces Black into a low position on the right. If instead Black answers 13 by connecting at *b*, then White forces with *c* and *d*, then switches elsewhere, for example, to *e*.

In any case, making the pincer at 2 in conjunction with Black's low position at  $\triangle$  goes against the logic of Go.




*Dia. 1: correcting the fuseki*

*Dia. 1.* In this position Black should

go for profit by occupying the key point of the corner with 2. Because of his low position with ②, Black's prospects for expansion on the right side are negligible.

Black waits for 3, then plays 4, a nice move in this position. Black 4 utilizes the latent potential of ③, as he can now aim at moves such as pushing at *a*. Black is developing at a nice and steady pace and his prospects seem favourable.

## THE FAKE FUSEKI II: POSITION B




Position B

In this position, Black 2 is not just a bad move but also a risky one. White has various continuations, but to show just one example, he can take the corner profit with the standard move of 3, then counter 4 and 6 with 7. This move makes effective use of White's ally ③ at the bottom right. This fight should be favourable for White.

Another strong move White could consider as an alternative to 3 is White *a*. If Black answers at 3, White

jumps again at *b* (or presses at *c*). In either case, the focal point of the position is White's large knight corner enclosure at ③.



*Dia. 1: correcting the fuseki*

*Dia. 1.* Black should be content to make the plain answer at 2. If White 3, Black counters by setting up a large moyo with 4.

It might also be possible to consider the daring leap out at *a* as an alternative to Black 2. If White 3, Black *b* or *c*—this large-scale strategy might well be an interesting approach.




# Reading Problems

by James Davies


These six problems are arranged in order of ascending difficulty. Numbers 2, 3, and 6 I picked out of professional games. The other three are from amateur play.

**Problem 1.** Black to play and kill White.




*Problem 1*

**Problem 2.** White to play. He can cut off something in the center.




*Problem 2*

**Problem 3.** White to play. This time he has to save his own five stones in the center.




*Problem 3*

**Problem 4.** Black to play. What is his best endgame sequence on the lower edge?




*Problem 4*

**Problem 5.** White to play and kill.  
**Problem 6.** Black to play. See if you can shatter White's center territory.



*Problem 5*




*Problem 6*

## ANSWERS


### Answer to problem 1.

Black 1 is a typical case of hane murder. A simple problem, but I have seen dan-level players misread it in actual play.



1. Answer


*Dia. 1.* The pitfall: if Black starts at what looks like the vital point at 1, White lives with 2 and 4.



*Dia. 1*


### Answer to problem 2.

Only White 1 works. Note its knight's-move relation to  $\triangle$  and  $\odot$ . Black 2 is the best defense, but White 3 promises a cut at either 4 or 5.



2. Answer


*Dia. 1.* If Black plays this way, White does even better, capturing the three stones in sente.



*Dia. 1*


### Answer to problem 3.

It is not beautiful shape, but White 1 does the job. Black's strongest replies are 2 and 4, but White 5 nails his two cutting stones.



3. Answer

*Dia. 1.* If White gives atari with 1 (or 1 at 3), he gives away everything.




*Dia. 1*

### Answer to problem 4.


Black 1 is a sacrifice to set up a shortage of liberties and make the cut

at 3 work. It is actually better for White to play 6 without exchanging 4 for 5, or to play 2 at 6, then ignore Black 3 to take sente at the possible cost of two more stones, but Black 1 is still correct.



4. Answer

*Dia. 1.* If Black cuts without sacrificing, letting White play 2, he gets less profit than in the correct answer and that in gote.




*Dia. 1*


### Answer to problem 5.

White 1 and 3, in that order, are the killing combination. If Black plays 4, White 5 catches him short of liberties.

*Dia. 1.* The only variation, but Black still cannot escape the shortage of liberties.



5. Answer




*Dia. 1*

### Answer to problem 6.


Black 1 is the move with which Shiraishi Yutaka won the 9-dan division of the First Kisei tournament. White 2

is the obvious answer, but Black gives atari with 3 and 5, then captures four stones with 7.

*Dia. 1.* This White 2 only raises the loss to six stones.




6. Answer




*Dia. 1*

*Dia. 2.* In desperation White tries just connecting at 2, but this is another failure.




*Dia. 2*

*Dia. 3.* If Black starts by peeping at 1, however, the connection at 4 does work. You can experiment with various other Black 5's, but you will find them all in vain.




*Dia. 3*

# ENDGAME CALCULATION




*Dia. 1*

*Dia. 1.* This is the result after a common joseki. In this shape—




*Dia. 2*

*Dia. 2.* How much do you suppose White's cut and capture is worth? To figure out its value, we have to compare the result of White's cut with the case in which Black plays first. Before we do that, though, let's look at the continuations from Dia. 2.




*Dia. 3*

*Dia. 3.* Black's continuation after Dia. 2 is the descent at 1. Later he will play *a*, which White answers at *b*. The only problem is that Black 1 is gote, so from the standpoint of endgame calculation theory, we can't use this case.



*Dia. 4*


*Dia. 4.* On the other hand, White's continuation is the hane at 1, which is sente. If Black tries blocking at 2, he'll get sliced up by White's cut at 3, so—



*Dia. 5*

*Dia. 5.* In response to White 1, Black will just pull back to 2.

If White plays the cut in Dia. 2, it is his privilege to play up to 1 in this diagram—Black 1 in Dia. 3 is gote for Black, so White 1 here is one-way sente. This is the basic rule we use whenever we are calculating the value of local endgame situations—this rule of “privilege to play”.




*Dia. 6*

*Dia. 6.* If White keeps crawling in at 3 after Dia. 5, Black will block at 4. White has to connect at 5, but thanks to his stone at  $\triangle$ , Black has no defect to patch, and it turns into gote for White.

So, according to our basic rule, we consider only the moves that are White's privilege to play, i.e., the ones that are one-way sente for him. In this case, that means the moves up to 1 in Dia. 5.






*Dia. 7*


*Dia. 7.* What will happen is that later Black will block at 1, and White answer at 2. In the same way that White 1 in *Dia. 5* is White's privilege, Black 1 here is Black's privilege. In this problem, we have privileges swinging both ways.

Now, we are going to look at Black's endgame plays in the original situation.



*Dia. 8*

*Dia. 8.* Black's move is his descent at 1. This finishes off the endgame in this area, and so this is probably how the situation will look at the very end of the game.




*Dia. 9*


*Dia. 9.* After the game is over and Black's liberty is filled, he will add a stone at  $\triangle$ .

*Dias. 10, 11.* These are the final results of White and Black playing first, respectively.

Finally, we are going to find the



*Dia. 10*



*Dia. 11*


value of the play in *Dia. 2* by comparing these two diagrams. Please take a minute and figure out the relative pluses and minuses of the two diagrams for yourself.

*White's territory:* 3 points bigger in *Dia. 10* than in *Dia. 11*. (Remember to count the place where he took a stone as two points.)

*Black's territory:* 5 points smaller in *Dia. 10* than in *Dia. 11*.

Therefore, the value of the first play in this area is five plus three, or *eight points*.


By the way, note that 1 in *Dia. 8* is the best way for Black to play here.




*Dia. 12*

*Dia. 12.* If he connects at 1 in this diagram instead, he may end up losing a point. Why?

*Dia. 13.* White still has the hane at 1. If Black plays elsewhere, White can crawl another space in sente, so Black will block with 2. Then White




*Dia. 13*



*Dia. 14*


will just play somewhere else.

*Dia. 14.* Later, Black may take the ko with 1, and—



*Dia. 15*


*Dia. 15.* Depending on how much ko material he has, he may even be able to connect with 3, but—



*Dia. 16*


*Dia. 16.* The result is exactly the same as if he had just descended in the first place. But, it is possible that White will be the one who connects the ko. If that happens, Black is one point the worse off. What it all boils down to, as I said before, is that for Black to connect instead of descending means he may lose a point.

*Dia. 17.* Therefore, Black should




*Dia. 17*

just descend right away with 1. Later, all that is going to happen is the exchange of  $\triangle$  for  $\triangle$ , which results in the same shape as *Dia. 16*.



*Dia. 18*

*Dia. 18.* If Black has no stone at *a*, though, he has to be careful. If he descends with 1 in that case, White has the nasty peep at 2. There are plenty of cases in games where it is better to connect at *b* and accept the possible 1-point loss.




*Dia. 19*

*Dia. 19.* The position we have looked at arises from this popular 5-4 point joseki.

(Translated by Bob Myers)

# ORIGINAL HANDICAP STRATEGY

Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan




*Basic Figure*

## Four-Stone Game Strategy

*Basic figure.* This month's strategy is to answer all White's opening *kararis* with diagonal moves like Black 2, 4, and 6. The diagonal move defends the corner while aiming toward a powerful attack, and it can be effective at any handicap, not just at four stones. A few years ago the amateur best ten used it successfully in their annual series of two-stone games against the professional best ten, for example.

One advantage of the diagonal move is that it carries Black ahead of White toward the center. Now let's see how to handle some white continuations.


If White makes the pincer attack at 7 in *Dia. 1*, Black should occupy the three-three point with 8. That gives him a fortress-like live corner to use in attacking the white stones on both sides. If White defends the left side by extending to 9, Black immediately




*Dia. 1*

pincers him on the lower side with 10. If White ignores Black 10, next either Black *a* or Black *b* is effective.

If White answers Black 10 with 1 etc. in *Dia. 2*, Black should skip out with 2 and 4. These moves open up vast prospects for him to the right, while White 3 and 5 do nothing more than escape, so it is not hard to see who is coming out ahead. Black need have no worries about letting his corner become surrounded. He would have to make two or three consecutive bad blunders in order for White to kill it.




*Dia. 2*



*Dia. 3*

We have seen that White 7 in *Dia. 1* does not turn out well, so let's let White play more reasonably by extending to 1 in *Dia. 3*. (White 1 at 6 is another possibility; we shall return to it in *Dia. 8*.) Black 2 is good, and if White approaches the last open corner with 3, Black makes the diagonal play at 4, then descends at 6, planting an iron pillar on the lower side.

One question that arises from Black's diagonal plays is which side to block on if White invades at the three-three



*Dia. 4*


point. If White continues from the last diagram by invading at 7 in *Dia. 4*, for example, Black 8 is absolute. White can link up with 9, but Black 8, 10, and the iron pillar (⊖) make a grand formation. This is the kind of framework that yields territory.

If Black tried to cut White off by playing 8 at 9, then after White 8, Black *a*, White *b*, Black *c*, White *d*, his potential territory would be largely gone and the iron pillar would have lost its usefulness.

When White invades at 11, however, Black should cut him off by blocking at 12. The reason is White ⊖. If Black blocked at 13, White ⊖ would keep him from getting any territory on the left side, and his wall might even come under attack.

After Black 12, White 13 to Black 22 are pretty much a set course, a sort of package tour. White takes the corner territory, but Black's outward thickness more than makes up for that. In particular, the white stone next to Black 22 is in a bad way.

If White tries to avoid hurting that stone by omitting 19 and 21, Black should descend at 1 in *Dia. 5*. If White ignores that, Black 2 kills the corner (if White *a*, Black *b* is the tesuji). White therefore has to crawl out with




*Dia. 5*



2 and 4, but it hurts a lot to be forced to crawl on the second line like this.


Anyone who feels uncomfortable about Black's result up to 22 in Dia. 4 can opt for the double-hane variation shown in *Dia. 6*. It has the advantage of leaving Black absolutely alive, but White now gets a better position on the outside.



What if White invades the lower right corner, where he has made a high kakari? *Dia. 7* shows the result. Once again, Black blocks on the side of his iron pillar, and while White lives in the corner, Black 6 does far more damage than the corner is worth by uprooting the stones marked △. In other words, the three-three point invasion just does not work; this is true in most cases where White has made a high kakari.

This completes our look at the three-three point invasion. If Black blocks on the correct side, he has nothing to worry about; in fact, it is often White who comes off badly.

Lastly, what should Black do if White plays 1 in *Dia. 8*? The pincer attack at 2 will rarely be wrong. If White runs out with the shoulder move at 3, Black 4 to 10 capture a large area on the upper left side. If White then invades at the three-three point



*Dia. 8*


*Dia. 9*

in *Dia. 9*, Black answers with 12 to 18. It may appear that Black is being sandwiched between two white positions, but the white group above, which is similarly sandwiched, is the one in trouble. The purpose of Black 12 is to attack it.


*Summary.* Black's diagonal play defends the corner while advancing toward the center. It is a fighting move, and it makes an ideal combination with the iron-pillar formation.

(Translated by James Davies)

## PROBLEMS



*Problem 1.* Black to play—he would like to get a ko here.




*Problem 2.* Black to play—again the problem is to get a ko.

Answers on Page 59

# NEW JOSEKI

by


Abe Yoshiteru 8-dan



*Dia. 1*

White 1 in *Dia. 1* is the new move under discussion this month. It was played by Fujisawa Shuko in the fourth game of the Kisei title series, White 12 in the figure below.


A similar move once appeared in a game between Honinbo Shusaku and Ota Yuzo. There the black pincer was one space further away, but Yuzo, with White, made the same type of shoulder play (an innovation then,




*Dia. 2*

too) and got the result shown in *Dia. 2*.

In the past, Black's two-space pincer has often been met by White 1 in *Dia. 3*. Replies at the points marked



*Dia. 3*



*Dia. 4*

## Game Figure

(1-41)

⊗ captures at ⑥


**Kisei Title Match**

**White**

Fujisawa Shuko, 9-dan


**Black**

Hashimoto Uтарo, 9-dan




× in *Dia. 4* are also standard, but Fujisawa's shoulder play is not among them\*. Here are three professionals' thoughts about the sequence in the figure.

Otake, Meijin: 'If Black cuts at 1 in *Dia. 5*, instead of playing 15 in the




*Dia. 5*



*Dia. 6*


figure, and White presses at 2, Black extends at 3, then White blocks at 4, White comes out ahead. But if Black answers White 2 by pushing once at 3 in *Dia. 6* before extending to 5, he can live in the corner with 7 when White blocks at 6, and this result favors him.'

Yamabe, 9-dan: When Black pushes at 3, White can give atari at 4 in *Dia. 7*,



*Dia. 7*

17 connects




*Dia. 8*


but Black's profit is large enough to outweigh White's wall by a little. Even if White makes the contact play at 2 in *Dia. 8*, the result through 17 favors Black.'

Ishida, 7-dan: 'Instead of playing 25 in the figure, Black should have

\* For a discussion of the existing josekis, see Ishida's *Dictionary of Basic Joseki*, Volume I Part 1, Chapter V.



*Dia. 9*




*Dia. 10*

taken the pon-nuki at 1 in *Dia. 9*, then turned elsewhere.'

At any rate, the result through Black 41 in the figure gave White the advantage. Black obviously took great pains in working out this sequence, but in the end his pon-nuki became redundant and he had to live in gote in the corner. The move to examine is Black 21. Here the lighter two-space extension to 1 in *Dia. 10* would have worked well.

The general character of White's new move is shown in *Dia. 11*, which



*Dia. 11*

repeats 12 to 17 in the figure. White has given Black a strong shape in the middle of the lower side, but Black's strength is somewhat cancelled by White △. In return, White has gained power to use in attacking (pincering) Black △. For White to hit this stone at *a* (White 18 in the figure) and descend does not seem right. *Dia. 10* then gives Black a good result. Instead of hitting △ at *a*, White would do better to make a pincer attack against it around *b*. That is my conclusion.

(Translated by James Davies)

# THE X-Y-Z AFFAIR

## Cast

X .....an amateur 2-dan  
Y .....an amateur 3-dan  
Z .....an amateur 1-kyu  
W .....an amateur 5-dan  
**Miyamoto Yoshihisa** . . . a professional 9-dan

## Scene

*The Kansai Ki-in in Osaka, where each month the X-Y-Z Club gathers to lay the work of two hapless amateurs on the dissecting table.*

W. This month's game was sent us by someone from Nara named S.

Y. Sent in spite of all the nonsense he knows we're going to say about it.

X. More likely he sent it to get Miyamoto's comments, not Y's gibberish. Don't misunderstand.

Y. Even the finest fish has to be spiced with soy sauce and horseradish.

Z. And you, no doubt, are the soy sauce.

Y. No, that's W. I'm the horseradish.

X. The stale horseradish.

Z. I don't want to hear what I'm supposed to be. Let's go on.

W. The letter accompanying the game says, 'I am a student living in Nara. I read *Igo Shincho* every month and always enjoy it, especially your article. I read that you were out of games, so I'm sending you this one, which I have just played. It's terrible, so please criticize it freely. I enclose my own commentary for your amusement. I was Black, and White was a four-dan player.'

Y. Thoughtful of him to help us out with our lack of material. Who won?

W. White won by six points.

Y. Even sent us a game that he lost.

I find myself admiring this young man more and more. Everyone should be like him.

X. Look out, S. When Y starts talking like this, you never know what he's going to say next. Miyamoto's starting to lay out the game.

*(Enter K of Kyoto)*

K. Where's this game from? *(examines the record)* The Nihon Ki-in Namba Branch's Institute of Go—say, that's where I serve as an advisor. Incidentally, Y, if you glance around, you'll see Wimmer, the 1974 European Champion, over there.

Y. How do you and he play?

K. In the past I've managed to beat him at two stones, but it's not easy.

Y. You're 7-dan, aren't you, K?

K. I guess so.

Y. But didn't you win the big rating tournament sponsored by the Yomiuri newspaper and the Kansai Ki-in a few years ago and get promoted to 8-dan? What happened to that?

X. That 8-dan ranking was just for one year, then you had to give it back and return to 7-dan—right, K?

K. Right.

Z. Shall we start getting down to




Figure 1 (1-13)


business?

**Miyamoto.** White 4 is unusual, but if White follows custom by putting 4 in the empty corner, Black can play at 4 and get the familiar Chinese opening. For that reason, White 4 makes some sense.


**X.** In other words, White's taking the point that Black wanted before Black can get it.

**K.** What about 8, Mr. Miyamoto?


**Miyamoto.** It's not bad. If White didn't play it and Black invaded at 1 in *Dia. 1*, the exchange of  $\triangle$  for  $\blacktriangle$



*Dia. 1*



*Dia. 2*




*Dia. 3*

**W.** K's arrival seems to have robbed me of my usual place in these proceedings, but I'll say that Black 13 was a powerful move.

**Miyamoto.** Black 13 was quite a good move. It took advantage of the ladder's being against White.

**Z.** What ladder?

**X.** Thank goodness Z is with us to ask these questions. With all the strong players in this room, the conversation



*Dia. 4*



was starting to get over my head.

**Miyamoto.** The ladder comes with White 5 in *Dia. 4*, but it doesn't work. That makes Black 13 in the figure highly playable.

**K.** Are these two weak or strong? (*Exit K*)

**X.** With one less expert around here the air is suddenly much clearer.

**Miyamoto.** 17 and 18 were natural, and Black 19 brought us to a rather interesting variation.






Figure 2 (14-29) ②④ takes ko

**W.** White played at 20 and Black connected at 21.


**Miyamoto.** He could have connected at 1 in *Dia. 5*, too. Then it gets difficult for both sides, but after Black 9 White seems to be in slightly more trouble, so perhaps Black should have connected at 1.



*Dia. 5*



*Dia. 6*



*Dia. 7*

**W.** Which means that White 20 in the figure was not so good.

**Miyamoto.** Perhaps so, in which case White should have taken the ko with 20 and ambled off from there.

**Z.** 'Ambled off' surpasses my comprehension.

**W.** It means White should have gone elsewhere, leaving the state of this corner undecided and keeping an eye on ko threats and such.

**Y.** Oh, how dull.

**Miyamoto.** If White used 20 to take the ko with 1 in *Dia. 6*, Black might dodge fighting with *a* or he might hane at 2. This hane would be a bit hard for White to cope with, since it's still the beginning of the game and he has no ko threats.

**X.** Let's go back to Black 21, which seems strange to me.

**Miyamoto.** It's correct shape.

**W.** In his own commentary, S says, 'I was startled by White's hane at 12. I thought I had to cut at 13, but then I was perplexed by White 14.'

**Y.** I don't see what he had to be startled or perplexed about. If he had played correctly, White would have been the one perplexed. But I'm not supposed to make remarks like this about other people.

**Miyamoto.** Black was pretty well outplayed by White up to 26.

**W.** Black 29 looks a little too nar-

row, but was it all right?

**Miyamoto.** It was definitely too narrow. Linking up on the left side with 1 in *Dia. 7* was bigger. Of course White could ignore this move, but—  
**Z.** Is Black actually linked up in *Dia. 7*?

**W.** The only way for White to unlink him is to connect at *a*, but if he does that and then loses the ko at *b*, White *a* ends up on Black's gift list. That makes it a hard move to play.





Figure 3 (30-56)

**Miyamoto.** White 30 was solid. Black enclosed the lower side with 31, but then White 32 was a beautiful move.

**Y.** After 33 and 34 it's all contact plays for a while, so we should start seeing a rash of mistakes.



*Dia. 8*

**X.** Mistake number one—


**Miyamoto.** Whether it was a mistake or not, cutting at Black 39 seems a trifle frantic. Black should have connected at 1 in *Dia. 8*, threatening to invade at *a*.

**W.** Black's cut at 39 let White cut at 40 in return, which hurt.


**Y.** Like being caught on the shin while thrusting at your opponent's torso.

**W.** Those ataris at Black 41 and 43 smell rotten.

**Miyamoto.** If Black's going to give atari at 41 and make White extend to 42, at least he has to continue on out with 1 in *Dia. 9*.



*Dia. 9*



*Dia. 10*

**Y.** And 43 was bad because Black had to go back after White 44 and connect at 45.

**Miyamoto.** Well, yes. 45 is the place to play, rather than 43. That would be Black 1 in *Dia. 10*. Aside from whether it's good in an absolute sense, it's better for Black than the actual game, since he hasn't made White extend to 44.

**Z.** I guess Black's already lost.

**Miyamoto.** Pretty nearly.

**Y.** Yes, but it would take a professional to resign here.


**X.** I've been farther ahead than this and gone on to lose—to Y for example.

**W.** White 48 was really taking risks in the midst of danger.

**Miyamoto.** It was an overplay. Black

49 and so on suddenly began to look as if they might have succeeded.

Y. 'Began to look as if they might have'—now there is a complex turn of phrase.




*Dia. 11* ③ connects

W. *Dia. 11* shows why White can't capture at *a* with 54. Black 4 gives a ladder. I'm pointing this out for the benefit of beginners.


Z. Yes, and stop staring in my direction. I'd be treated like an expert if I went back to the country, while here I'm considered a beginner. This is what I get for succumbing to the lure of the big city and leaving home.

Miyamoto. At White 48, the proper move was to grip the black stone with White 54. Black started to grab this chance with 51 and 53, but then unfortunately he connected at 57 and it started to slip away.

Y. Another complex phrase.



*Figure 4* (57—64)



*Dia. 12*

Miyamoto. Black should have given atari with 1 in *Dia. 12* and bridged across with 3, 5, and 7. That would have been quite good for him, but just when he had everything ready for this tesuji, he connected at 57 and lost the fruit of his labors.

W. Now the sequence really gets difficult.

Y. From here on, strength determines the winner.


X. Luck may have something to do with it.

Y. Luck comes to the strong.

Miyamoto. Black 61 to 63 in *Figure 4* were all forced.

W. But when White turned at 64, his fortunes began to look doubtful.

Miyamoto. He could have taken a large territory on the right side by making the hane at 1 in *Dia. 13* and playing 3, 5, and 7.




*Dia. 13*

Y. White's fortunes may be looking doubtful, but does he actually lose this fight?

W. By this point I think even I can answer your question. Black 1 to 7 in *Dia. 14* win outright, don't they, Mr. Miyamoto?


Miyamoto. Right. If Black had played



*Dia. 14*


this way, White would have lost.

**Y.** But these two never play the way they're supposed to. Black made hane at 65 and 67.




*Figure 5 (65—77)*

**Miyamoto.** Apparently Black saw that if he just filled a liberty with 1 in *Dia. 15*, he'd lose by one move. Now




*Dia. 15*

if White were to answer Black 67 carelessly by blocking at 1 in *Dia. 16*, then Black could play 2 and 4 and White would be caught short of liberties at *a* and *b*. White therefore played 68, but the 68–69 exchange would have been better left unplayed. What White should have done was to capture the black stones in the middle with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 17*, ending the game.



*Dia. 16*

**Z.** But he failed to do that and lost the fight.




*Dia. 17*

**Miyamoto.** Lose it he did, but a great deal happened before the end.

**Y.** You mean White had yet another chance?

**Miyamoto.** At White 70, for instance, he could still have played *Dia. 17*, but the real mistake was in trading White 72 for Black 73. Black answered White 74 by drawing back at 75, which looks natural, but suppose he had cut at 1 in *Dia. 18*. White could give atari at 2, but nothing more, since he's short of liberties.



*Dia. 18*

**Y.** These stones keep teetering back and forth between destruction and survival.

**Miyamoto.** White made the last mistake by connecting at 76 and letting Black connect at 77. If he had pushed through at 77, Black's whole group would have been crushed.


**Miyamoto.** But White 76 reversed everything.

**Y.** Who won this game again?

**X.** White did—in the end.


(Translated by James Davies from the July 1977 *Igo Shincho*)

# BLUEPRINT 361




*Position 1*

**Position 1.** Black to play. Which of the following three blueprints would you agree with?




*A's Blueprint*

**A:** Black has to use the thickness gained from pushing four times in the lower right by attacking with the knight's move at 1. If White plays 2 and Black 3, White's in for a hard time.



*Position 2*


**Position 2.** Black to play. Who has the right idea—A, B, or C?



*A's Blueprint*


**A:** Black should apply pressure from above with 1. If White plays 2, Black pushes with 3 and erects a gigantic framework in the center.






### *B's Blueprint*

**B:** No, wouldn't it be more effective for Black to peep at 1 and block at 3? First he should stabilize his own group, then he can take aim at the eyeless white stones to left and right.




## C's Blueprint

**C:** Ancient wisdom tells us to hane at the head of two stones in a position like this. If White jumps out to 2, Black plays 3 and 5. That gives him the more powerful overall position.



## *B's Blueprint*


**B:** Black should take the last large point at 1—this is an order of magnitude bigger than anything else. If White 2, Black plays 3 and has frameworks on both the left and upper sides.



## C's Blueprint


**C:** Black should split the lower side with 1. He can expect White 2, whereupon he jumps to 3, helping his three stones on the right while breaking up White's territory.

**Position 1.** From a game between Honinbo Shuwa (black) and Yasui Sanchi. C's blueprint is correct.




*Correct Answer*

*Correct answer:* C's seemingly lukewarm hane at *a* is the key point on the board. If Black neglects it, White will make him eat the double hane at 1 and 3, then follow with a peeping move at 5 which Black will have difficulty answering. His supposedly thick wall could easily become the object of an attack, and he is going to have his hands full.



*Dia. 1*


*Dia. 1.* Black 1 is the key point. 'Hane at the head of two stones without even looking,' as the saying goes. White jumps out from the lower side with 2, but the hane at 1 has given Black the right to play 3 and 5. The right side looks narrow, but when Black guards his cutting points with 7 his shape becomes very thick. These plays also serve, of course, to attack the three white stones and defend the two black stones on the upper side. White, for his part, naturally caps the lower side with 8.



*Dia. 2*


*Dia. 2.* There Black has the peep at 9 and block at 11 ready with which to form eye space. If White hanes at 12, Black plays 13 and White's attack runs out of steam. Living like this is a shrewd way for Black to play, showing good judgement of the overall balance of the game.

*Dia. 3.* A's proposal was to attack aggressively with the knight's move at 1. This aggressive mentality is a very necessary part of the game, but it is out of place in the present situation.



*Dia. 3*


White jumps to 2, threatening to cut. Black can steal White's base with 3, but the diagonal contact play at 4 means that sooner or later Black will have to go back and add another stone. On top of that, he may have to cope with White *a*, Black *b*, White *c*, Black *d*, White *e*.



*Dia. 4*

*Dia. 4.* Last comes B's negative plan to stabilize his own group by peeping at 1. It is often true in go that stabilizing one's own group lets the enemy stabilize his. When Black blocks at 3, White turns at 4, forces

Black with 6, and gets a good formation by jumping out to 8. White 4 at *a* and White 8 at *b* are also worth considering. Whichever White chooses, he has an easier position than Black.



*Reference Figure (1-75)*


*Reference Figure.* White attempted to complicate the game by invading the left side with 50. Black answered White 56 with the hitting-under tesuji at 57, then gave atari at the key point 59. White's attempt ended in failure and he lost the game by ten points.

**Position 2.** From a game between Shuwa (white) and Ota Yuzo. A's blueprint is correct.

*Correct Answer.* So far, the game pits White's edge territory against Black's outer influence. The large knight's move at Black 1 maintains consistency. White is forced to reply at 2, and Black keeps pushing hard with 3 and 5. If White guards his profit with 6, Black forces him with 7, then uses 9 to set up a magnificent framework, the scale of which outdoes


even Honinbo Takemiya.

*Dia. 1.* Black naturally has to consider White's contact jump at 2, but he




*Correct Answer*

has a tesuji in the wedge at 3. If White gives atari at 4 and connects at 6, Black shifts to 7. Black 9 threatens both *a* and *b*; if White defends one point, Black takes the other. Either way, White suffers greatly, so his counterattack at 2 is a failure.




*Dia. 1*

*Dia. 2.* B's proposed extension to the large point at 1 does not merit



*Dia. 2*

much approval. The urgent matter is to keep White from advancing from the lower side into the center. When Black lets White jump to 2 so easily, his whole game falls apart. Observe the way White 2 reduces Black's central framework while simultaneously defending the lower side. This is an ideal move. Black 3 develops both the three black stones below and the black framework above, but the standard shoulder play at White 4 throws the center further out of joint, leaving




*Dia. 3*

Black with a disagreeable board position.

*Dia. 3.* C's plan was to invade the lower side with Black 1, but this is the worst blueprint of all. Again White 2 is ideal. Black 1 and 3, which break up the lower side while aiding the three black stones above, are overshadowed by White's simple jump to 4, which puts a quick end to Black's center prospects. The black group including 1 and 3 still lacks roots, and seems likely to become a burden as the game advances.

*Reference Figure.* The original commentary describes White 28 and 38 as moves that only Shuwa could get away with. Anyone who imitated him would be sure to lose. Black 43 completed construction of a huge framework and gave Black good prospects,


but White made a brilliant exchange in the upper right and won the game by two points.



Reference Figure (1-66)


(Translated by James Davies)

## Answers to problems on page 45




*Dia. 1: correct*

*Dia. 1.* The placement at 1 is the right move, as it enables Black to set up a ko with 3 and 5.




*Dia. 2: wrong*

*Dia. 2.* Reversing the order of 1 and 3 is a big mistake, as now White can live with 4.



*Dia. 1: correct*

*Dia. 1.* The moves from 1 to 4 are forced. Black then sets up a one-move approach-move-ko with 5 and 7, thus giving himself a chance to kill the whole white group.




*Dia. 2: wrong*


*Dia. 2.* Black 3 here goes the wrong way. White counters with 4 and 6 and Black can do nothing.




# IS IT A LADDER? ANSWERS




Problem 1 : YES

Black  turns out to be useful—White is nicely caught.




Problem 2 : NO

At first glance, 14 and 16 might seem to do the trick, but White escapes because 17 is atari.




Problem 3 : YES

White may breathe a sigh of relief when he connects at 15, but it is premature—Black finishes him off with a throw-in.




Problem 4 : YES

14 and 16 are the key moves. Black then comes from underneath with 18.



Problem 5 : YES

Black cleverly squeezes with 14 etc.—White is annihilated.



Problem 6 : NO

Black's ladder fails because of White 17. Playing 17 at 19 is a bad mistake, as Black then plays 17.

## PAGE FROM GO HISTORY

### THE FIRST HONINBO TITLE

**White:** Kato Shin 7-dan

**Black:** Sekiyama Riichi 6-dan  
1941, Game 6 (no komi)

When Shusai Meijin, the 21st Honinbo and last hereditary head of the Honinbo Go house retired in 1938, he ceded the title of Honinbo to the Nihon Ki-in. With the sponsorship of the Mainichi newspaper, the Nihon Ki-in established the modern Honinbo title which is decided by open competition among all professional players. At first, however, competition was restricted to high-ranked players. The first title began in June 1939 with a preliminary tournament with 27 participants. Eight of these won their way into a round-robin league in which Sekiyama took first place and Kato second (the other members were Go Seigen, Maeda, Kubomatsu Katsukiyo, Suzuki Tamejiro, Segoe Kensaku and Kitani Minoru). Sekiyama and Kato then played a six-game match, which ended in a 3-3 tie. According to the

rules, Sekiyama, as winner of the final league, became the 1st Honinbo and took the title of Honinbo Risen.

**Figure 1 (1-40).** With 17 and 19, Black's strategy is to seize the large fuseki points before White. This permits White the nice attacking move at 20, but Black settles his group lightly and, moreover, in sente. Black 31, preventing White *a*, is an important point.




Figure 2 (41-100)

**Figure 2 (41-100).** Black 53 is a strong move. If White 1 in *Dia. 1*, Black plays 2, then switches to 65. Black cannot ignore White 54, however, as White threatens to attach at *a* next.

73 puts Black slightly ahead, so White attacks at 74. However, 77 is a strong counterattack.

Black 83 is necessary to prevent White from attaching at *b*. Black 89






Figure 1 (1-40)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Figure 3 (101-149)

is worth nearly 20 points.

If Black 95 at *c*, then White *d*.

**Figure 3 (101-149).** White 34 is preparation for 38. Even if Black answers 38 at 1 in *Dia. 2*, he ends in gote, so he switches to 39.

White resigns after 149. He is about ten points behind.

Sekiyama fell ill during the second game of his first defence of the title in 1943 and lost it to Hashimoto Utao. He died in 1970. Sekiyama Toshio 9-dan, of the Kansai Ki-in, is his son.

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#### DENMARK

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Nihon Ki-in Scandinavian Chapter, c/o Mr. Sen Suzuki, Vesterbrogade 12<sup>4<sup>th</sup></sup>, DK-1620 Copenhagen V. Tel. 213024

#### SWEDEN

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Club: S:t Paulsgatan 39A. Wed. 18.00-22.00.

Goteborg Go Club: Mr. Christer Lindstedt, Landa-  
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#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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Go Club Tesla Karlin Praha, also c/o Dr. Prokop.

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#### JAPAN

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